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COMMENTS
DESIGNING PROCEDURE TO SUIT TITLE
VII's PURPOSE: BIBBS v. BLOCK
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),'
an allegedly discriminatory employment decision that affects an in-
dividual employee may be challenged in a disparate treatment ac-
tion.2 To establish Title VII liability under this theory, the plain-
tiff must prove the employer's discriminatory motive,3 and that
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)("Title VII"). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
the first comprehensive federal legislation designed to remedy the various manifestations of
racial discrimination in modern American society. See M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 8 (1966).
One section of Title VII prohibits the following discriminatory employment practices:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
2 See L. MODJEsKA, HANDLING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES § 1.8 (1980). Dispa-
rate treatment cases involve the less favorable treatment of single or multiple employees on
account of "their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." See id. at 335 n.15 (1977).
The Supreme Court has identified two distinct types of employment discrimination:
disparate treatment and disparate impact. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S.
324, 335 (1977). Disparate treatment actions generally involve intentional discrimination di-
rected at one individual, see Fourth Circuit Review, Allocation of Burdens of Proof in Dis-
parate Treatment Cases of Title VII Litigation, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 637, 638 (1982),
while a disparate impact plaintiff claims "that a facially neutral employment practice actu-
ally falls more harshly on one racial group," and results in an adverse or disparate impact on
the whole group. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 583 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION §§ 72.00-80.00 (1986) (discussion of employment practices, procedural and evi-
dentiary devices, defenses and individual relief in disparate impact suits).
I International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (proof of discriminatory motive
critical); Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treat-
ment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (1980) (impermissible discriminatory motive re-
TITLE VII
discriminatory animus played a causal factor in the employment
decision.4 However, Title VII's affirmative remedies of retroactive
promotion and backpay5 will not automatically be awarded upon a
quired). Specific intent or willfulness is not necessary to establish discriminatory motive if
the employer's "general intent to discriminate" meets statutory muster, see Laffey v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 454-55 & n.171 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086
(1978), because of the plaintiff's difficulty in producing direct evidence on discriminatory
motivation. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 16 (1976). Cir-
cumstantial evidence may adequately establish this intent. See United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983); cf. Player, The Evidentiary Nature
of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 49 Mo. L. REv. 17, 18
(1984) (discriminatory intent may be inferred from objective facts). However, an adverse
employment decision itself is insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory motive. See Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44. Instead, the Title VII plaintiff must at
least prove that the adverse employment decision did not result from "absolute or relative
lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought." Id.
A procedure that enables plaintiffs to show an employer's discriminatory intent was
developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). The McDon-
nell standard consists of a three-step approach: The first step places upon the plaintiff the
initial burden of establishing a "prima facie case of racial discrimination," id. at 802, which
can be satisfied by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications.
Id. Once a plaintiff establishes his prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence, a
rebuttable presumption of discriminatory motive is created. Texas Dep't of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981). The burden of production thereafter shifts to
the defendant to rebut this prima facie case. Id. at 254-55 & n.8. A successful rebuttal is
accomplished when the defendant "articulate[s] some legitimate, non-discriminatory rea-
son" for the employment decision, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, and in-
troduces evidence sufficient to raise "a genuine issue of fact" concerning motivation for the
decision. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 254-55. In the final step, plain-
tiff must demonstrate that the defendant's articulated business reason was "in fact pre-
text[ual]." McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
Some examples of pretextual evidence given by the McDonnell Court include prior
treatment of the plaintiff, defendant's reaction to any civil rights activities of the plaintiff
and defendant's general treatment of other minority employees. Id. at 804-05. See generally
2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, at § 50.73(a) (factual illustrations of pretext).
4 See Dougherty v. Barry, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1201 (D.D.C. 1985) Belton,
Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural
Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1223-24 (1981). Uncertainty exists as to the exact causation
standard needed to establish Title VII liability, American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Fed-
eral Labor Relations Auth., 716 F.2d 47, 51 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and courts have adopted
different causal standards. See, e.g., Satz v. I.T.T. Fin. Corp., 619 F.2d 738, 746 (8th Cir.
1980) (causal standard requires race as factor in decision); Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d
1282, 1289 (8th Cir. 1979) (motivating factor standard); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990-
91 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (substantial factor standard).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1982), which states in pertinent part: "If the court finds
that the [employer] has intentionally engaged ... in an unlawful employment practice...
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finding of Title VII liability.' The weight of authority suggests that
first a higher standard of causation must be established by the
plaintiff seeking these affirmative remedies, 7 and second, to avoid
imposition of these affirmative remedies, the evidentiary burden is
on the Title VII defendant to demonstrate that, absent the dis-
crimination, the identical employment decision would have re-
sulted.' Recently, in Bibbs v. Block,9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed this post-liability analy-
sis by holding that the employer's discriminatory motive must be
the "but for" cause of the employment decision before Title VII's
affirmative remedies will be awarded ° and that the plaintiff bears
[it may] order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include. . . rein-
statement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay. . . ." Id. In some instances,
retroactive promotion is also an available remedy. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, at § 55.23.
For purposes of this Comment, the terms retroactive hiring and reinstatement will be used
interchangeably with the phrase retroactive promotion.
The back pay provision of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §
160(c) (1982), served as the model for Title VII's back pay provision. See Back Pay in Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases, 35 VAND. L. RaV. 893, 904 (1982). However, when compared
to NLRA cases, Title VII's affirmative remedies are not granted as liberally by courts. See
id. Additional remedies available for Title VII discrimination victims include injunctive re-
lief against future discriminatory practices and awards for attorney fees. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g),(k) (1982). See generally A. LARSON, supra note 2, at §§ 58.00 - 58.32 (issues in
awarding attorney fees).
0 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982), which states in relevant part:
No order of the court shall require ... the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of
an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any backpay, if such indi-
vidual . ..was refused employment or advancement or was suspended or dis-
charged for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, reli-
gion, sex or national origin.
Id. Therefore, back pay and retroactive promotion are not mandatory remedies even if a
Title VII violation is established; rather, such a remedial award lies in the discretion of the
court. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-16 (1975) See also 118 CONG.
REc. 7168 (1972) (under remedial provision, courts possess "wide discretion" to fashion re-
lief). The equitable nature of Title VII relief justifies the broad discretion given the court.
See Comment, Back Pay for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII - Role of the
Judiciary in Exercising its Discretion, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 525, 529 (1974).
7 See, e.g., Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (9th Cir.
1984) (retroactive remedial award justified when discrimination constitutes "but for" cause
of employment decision); King v. Trans World Airlines, 738 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1984)
(same); Patterson v. Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1982) (same).
" See, e.g., Caviale v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Serv., 744 F.2d 1289, 1296
(7th Cir. 1984) (defendant must sustain burden of proving that discriminatory factor was
not "but for" cause); Richerson v. Jones,' 551 F.2d 918, 924-25 (3d Cir. 1977) (same); A.
LARSON, supra note 2, at § 55.34 (same).
9 778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985)
10 Id. at 1319.
TITLE VII
the burden of proof on this issue.11
In Bibbs, a black employee of the United States Department
of Agriculture, Thomas Bibbs, unsuccessfully sought promotion to
a vacant supervisory position.' 2 Subsequently, Bibbs instituted a
Title VII action alleging that racial discrimination constituted the
primary reason for the promotion denial.13 At the district court
hearing, the court found that the "key figure" on the selection
committee14 that evaluated these promotion applications had ut-
tered racially derogatory remarks about the plaintiff and other mi-
nority employees on several occasions. 5 Additionally, the district
court noted that the credibility of the selection committee mem-
bers' testimony in support of their promotion decision was highly
suspect. 6 However, the court found that the white employee se-
lected for the supervisory position was an acceptable candidate
and that the plaintiff "had a history of disciplinary and interper-
sonal problems."17 The district court concluded that although race
was a "discernible factor" in the decision, it was not the "but for"
cause required to establish a Title VII violation, and therefore held
for the defendant.'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in a
" Id. at 1319, 1325.
12 Bibbs v. Block, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 33,779, at 30,745 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
Bibbs was employed as an offset press operator and applied for the position of offset press
operator supervisor. He was the only black applicant in a pool of seven. Id.
1 Bibbs v. Block, 749 F.2d 508, 509 (8th Cir. 1984). Bibbs also alleged age discrimina-
tion because the successful applicant was thirty-three years old, ten years younger than
Bibbs. Bibbs, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 1 30,745. The district court concluded that age was not
a factor in the decision and consequently dismissed this claim. See id. at 1 30,748.
14 Bibbs, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. at S 30,745. All members of the selection committee were
white. Id.
" Id. at 5 30,746. Evidence was introduced indicating that the "key figure," Joseph
Tresnak, used such racially disparaging statements as "boy" and "nigger" in the presence of
other black employees. Id. Additionally, Tresnak directed some of his remarks at the plain-
tiff, calling him a "black militant." See id. The district court stated that "[t]he remarks are
some evidence of discriminatory feelings on Tresnak's part, which somewhat taint the selec-
tion process." Id.
16 See id. The court noted that the committee members' testimony was "guarded" and
"defensive." Id.
7 Id. at T 30,746-47. The white employee had both technical expertise and supervisory
experience, id. at 30,746, whereas Bibbs' employment history indicated an inability to
work cooperatively with others. Id. at 1 30,746-47.
18 Id. at 1 30,747. However, the court "invite[d] correction from the Court of Appeals in
the event it concludes that plaintiff need only establish that race was a discernible factor at
the time of the decision." Id. See also infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (court of
appeals' conclusion).
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panel decision, vacated the district court's judgment, remanded
the case and instructed the district court to enter judgment for the
plaintiff.19 Chief Judge Lay wrote that the district court erred
when it required the plaintiff to prove "but for" causation.2"
Rather, a finding that race was a discernible factor in the promo-
tion decision sufficiently demonstrated that more likely than not,
the decision was influenced by race, and was thereby in violation of
Title VII.21
The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, granted the defendant's
petition for rehearing and therefore automatically vacated the
panel court's decision.22 Nonetheless, the en banc court reaffirmed
the panel court's application of the discernible factor standard in
determining Title VII liability.23 The majority further held that
the defendant may avoid a remedial order of retroactive promotion
and backpay if he establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
19 Bibbs v. Block, 749 F.2d 508, 513 (8th Cir. 1984). In addition, the district court was
ordered to determine the proper remedy "to make plaintiff whole." Id.
20 Id. at 512. See also supra note 4 (discussing array of causal standards applied by
federal courts). The court stated that the "but for" standard was an excessive burden be-
cause it unreasonably required the plaintiff to prove the "hypothetical fact" that a different
decision would have resulted absent discrimination. Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 512. In effect, this
required the plaintiff to disprove the defendant's allegations of its subjective intent. Id. at
512-13. The defendant's "superior access to proof of its actual motivation" made the plain-
tiff's ability to prove such subjective intent unrealistic. Id. at 513.
21 Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 511-13. The court noted that the discernible factor standard was
proper in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 511-13. Chief Judge Lay stated that the district
court's discernible factor finding implied that the court had progressed to the third stage of
the McDonnell analysis. See id. at 510-11. See also supra note 4 (discussion of McDonnell
analysis). The court asserted that the district court's additional finding that the same deci-
sion would have resulted absent discrimination was inapposite to the McDonnell analysis,
see Bibbs, 749 F.2d at 511, and "inherently inconsistent" with the district court's finding
that race was a discernible factor in the employment decision. See id. at 512. However, in a
footnote, Chief Judge Lay noted the difficulties of applying McDonnell to mixed motive
cases. See id. at 511 n.1 (pretext rationale assumes single motive in decision). This observa-
tion is inconsistent with the Chief Judge's subsequent en banc concurrence in which he
suggests that the McDonnell is equally appropriate for mixed motive cases. See infra note
33 and accompanying text.
22 Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1319 (8th Cir. 1985).
23 Id. The majority stated that the district court's finding that race constituted a dis-
cernible factor in the promotion decision was equivalent to a determination that race was a
"motivating factor," and sufficient for Title VII liability. See id. at 1321 n.4. Judge Arnold
stressed that Title VII liability exists when the defendant's consideration of race puts the
plaintiff "at a disadvantage in the competition for promotion." Id. at 1321. "Every kind of
disadvantage resulting from racial prejudice in the employment setting is outlawed," not-
withstanding the fact that Bibbs would not have been promoted absent discrimination. Id.
at 1322.
TITLE VII
that the same decision would have resulted irrespective of any
discrimination. 24
Stressing that the defendant's decision was based upon mixed
motives,2 5 Judge Arnold, writing for the court, stated that the ap-
propriate analysis for such cases requires separation of the liability
and remedial determination issues.26 The opinion emphasized that
the justification for this methodology is readily apparent in the
language of Title VII,27 which utilizes comparatively lenient terms
to define illegal conduct,2 while demanding more rigorous require-
" Id. at 1319, 1325. Judge Arnold noted that some courts have imposed upon the de-
fendant a clear and convincing burden of proof standard in this remedial stage. Id at 1324
n.5. See also infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussion of various burdens of proof).
However, the court stated that the Eighth Circuit has rejected the clear and convincing
standard in similar contexts, citing Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 470
n.8 (8th Cir. 1984). See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1324 n.5. But see infra note 35 and accompanying
text (Judge McMillan supports clear and convincing standard).
In a concurrence, Judge Bright agreed with the application of the "same decision test"
in the remedial stage. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1328 (Bright, J., concurring). Judge Bright
hypothesized that in a situation when race comprises only a minor factor, it is unfair not to
allow the employer an opportunity to rebut back pay and retroactive promotion remedies.
See id. at 1328-29 (Bright, J., concurring). Without the "same decision" test, an employer
would be forced to reinstate unqualified employees in such hypothetical situations. See id.
at 1329. (Bright, J., concurring).
25 Mixed motivation decisions occur when legitimate business reasons as well as dis-
criminatory considerations induce the business decision. See Note, Determining a Standard
of Causation for Discriminatory Discharges Under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 913, 917 (1981). This factual scenario is distinguishable from
single motivation decisions "in which the issue is whether illegal or legal motives, but not
both, were the 'true' motives behind the decision." See NLRB v. Transportation Manage-
ment Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1983).
26 See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1321. For support of this procedure, the majority cited an
article by Professor Brodin, who argues that to establish Title VII liability, the plaintiff
must prove that race was a motivating factor in the decision; however, the "but for" causa-
tion standard applies to the remedial stage. See Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the
Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 323-26
(1982). Additionally, the court noted that this two step liability/remedial analysis has been
employed by other federal circuits. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1323. See, Caviale v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv., 744 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (7th Cir 1984); Pollard v. Grinstead,
741 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1984). See also infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. (justifica-
tions for independent analyses of liability and remedy).
Judge Arnold noted that the McDonnell evidentiary procedure discerns whether legal
or illegal motives, but not both, actuated the employment decision, and therefore, is not
applicable to mixed motive decisions. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1320.
217 Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1332.
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). An "unlawful employment practice" includes a
failure to promote or actions which otherwise "discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his. . .terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race. .. " Id. Judge Arnold interpreted this provision as outlawing any discrimination that
detrimentally affects a worker in his employment setting. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322. See
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ments for an award of affirmative remedies. 29 As a result, Judge
Arnold concluded that by successfully proving Title VII liability
without more, the plaintiff is entitled only to an injunction against
future employment discrimination and attorney fees.30
In his concurrence, Chief Judge Lay criticized the majority's
application of the "same decision" test, arguing that the use of this
test in disparate treatment suits will result in "hollow victories" to
discrimination victims,31 and will "inject total confusion into the
already difficult process faced by litigants who pursue relief under
Title VII." 2 Chief Judge Lay further asserted that the McDonnell
analysis is equally suited to mixed motive cases.3 3 In his concurring
opinion, Judge McMillan agreed that in applying the "same deci-
sion" test, the court properly allocated the burden to the defend-
ant-discriminator, 4 but stressed that a clear and convincing stan-
dard is more beneficial than the majority's preponderance
standard.3 5
also infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. (policy justifications for lenient liability
terms).
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982): "No order of the court shall require the ... pro-
motion ...or . . .payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was refused ...
advancement... for any reason other than discrimination.. ." Id. Hence, the court stated
that the statute does not mandate the award of retroactive promotion and back pay unless
it is appropriate. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1322. An affirmative remedies award is proper only
when the discriminatory factor was the "but for" cause of the employment decision. See id.
Judge Arnold noted that this "but for" analysis is "consistent with Title VH's intended
purpose of making persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination." Id. (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). See
also infra note 42 and accompanying text (separate liability and remedial determinations
are consistent with objective of making victims whole).
"0 Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1324. See generally supra note 5 (discussion of statutory authority
for attorney fees and injunctive relief).
" See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1326-27 (Lay, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Lay asserted that
applying the same decision test will, in effect, require the plaintiff to additionally demon-
strate that race was the "sole cause," and allow the defendant a second chance to "excul-
pate" himself. See id. (Lay, C.J., concurring).
31 Id. at 1328. (Lay, C.J., concurring). The burden shifting "same decision" test is inap-
propriate under the principles of McDonnell. See id. at 1327-28 (Lay, C.J., concurring). This
method is relevant to "constitutionally protected conduct cases," stated the Chief Judge,
not Title VII cases. Id. at 1328 (Lay, C.J., concurring). See also Mt. Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (applying method to first amendment
retaliatory discharge cases).
33 See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1328. (Lay, C.J., concurring). But see supra note 21 (panel
court's assertion that McDonnell may be inappropriate for mixed motive cases).
34 Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1329 (McMillan, J., concurring).
31 Id. (McMillan, J., concurring). Judge McMiUan asserted that this higher standard is
justified because it deters employment discrimination, and because the defendant's unlawful
conduct made it more difficult to prove that the same decision would have occurred in any
TITLE VII
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Ross argued that a finding of
Title VII liability requires a showing that race played a motivating
factor in the employment decision; a mere discernible factor stan-
dard is insufficient.3 6 Therefore, Judge Ross concluded that the
plaintiff did not even prove a Title VII violation.37
The Bibbs majority stated that support for a two-step analysis
is implicit within Title VII's statutory language.38 This Comment
will suggest that Title VII's objectives and procedure will be fur-
ther facilitated by independent liability and remedial determina-
tions. With respect to the causation standard in the liability stage,
a minimum causal standard that best advances Title VII's objec-
tive of eradicating all discrimination in the workplace will be advo-
cated. Finally, this Comment will suggest a higher burden of proof
standard for the remedial stage that will both prevent the unjust
enrichment of the discrimination victim and serve to deter dis-
crimination by the employer.
POLICY AND PROCEDURAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A Two STAGE
ANALYSIS
United States Supreme Court interpretations of Title VII in-
dicate that its objectives are twofold: the achievement of equal em-
ployment opportunities through the elimination of discriminatory,
obstacles in the work place 9 and compensation for injuries caused
by unlawful employment discrimination. ° Separate determinations
of liability and remedies most effectively advance these policy
objectives. When Title VII liability is conditioned on a separate
determination that requires a rigorous test standard, the deter-
rence of all forms of employment discrimination will be a natural
consequence, regardless of this discrimination's effect on the em-
event. Id. (McMillan, J., concurring).
Id. at 1330 (Ross, J., dissenting). Judge Ross indicated that statutory language in
Title VII requires a causal standard while the majority's discernible factor standard implies
that no causal relationship is necessary for Title VII liability. See id. at 1330-31. (Ross, J.,
dissenting). The motivating factor standard, Judge Ross stated, is consistent with previous
Supreme Court holdings which discuss proof of intentional discrimination. See id. at 1331
(Ross, J., dissenting); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981).
See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1330, 1332 (Ross, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1322. See also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing basis
for separate liability and remedial determinations).
"' See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
'1 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
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ployment decision.41 Moreover, allowing employers to rebut post-
liability awards of back pay and retroactive promotion is consis-
tent with Title VII's "make whole" purpose since only those Title
VII plaintiffs who have suffered actual financial loss will receive
back pay and retroactive promotion.42 Thus, this two-step analysis
provides the most effective procedure for promoting the twin stat-
utory objectives of Title VII.
In addition to the policy justification for a two-step analysis,
this methodology will facilitate the resolution of the separate
causal standards found in the liability and remedial determina-
tions. A plaintiff establishes Title VII liability when he demon-
strates that a discriminatory motive was a factor in the employ-
ment decision. 4 This may be proved either by resorting to the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green procedure44 or by offering di-
rect evidence of employment discrimination.4 A different causal
standard is employed once a plaintiff shows that discriminatory
motives played a role in the employment decision.46 The defendant
employer may avoid the back pay and retroactive promotion reme-
dies by establishing that his discrimination was not the "but for"
cause of the decision. 47 Therefore, the division of liability and re-
4' See Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Tamm, J., concurring)
(lower liability causal standard reflects Title VII's "deterrent purpose"). Cf. Case Note,
Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1983), 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 863, 874-76
(1983) ("but for" liability causation standard encourages discriminatory decisions).
42 See Toney, 705 F.2d at 1373 (Tamm, J., concurring). "If the employer were not al-
lowed to show that the same employment decision would have resulted even absent discrim-
ination, the Title VII plaintiff who receives retroactive relief might be placed in a better
position than he or she would have occupied if the employer had not acted unlawfully." Id.
See also C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER, & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 9.1 (1980 & Supp. 1985) (retroactive remedies should be limited to dis-
crimination victims with substantiated economic loss).
"' See Toney, 705 F.2d at 1372 (Tamm, J., concurring); Satz v. I.T.T. Fin. Corp., 619
F.2d 738, 746 (8th Cir. 1980). See also infra notes 49 and 50 and accompanying text (dis-
cernible factor standard most appropriate).
" 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also supra note 3 (general discussion of McDonnell
framework).
41 See Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir.) (Mc-
Donnell formula does not apply where direct evidence of discrimination is shown), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 385 (1985); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.
1983) (same), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
"e See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
47 See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1323-24. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text. Thus,
the plaintiff can conceivably prove sufficient causation to establish liability, but insufficient
causation for retroactive relief. See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1321-22; Taylor v. Franklin Drapery
Co., 441 F. Supp. 279, 291-93 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
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medial determinations into two separate procedural processes pro-
vides courts with the most orderly method to dispose of these dif-
ferent causation issues. 8
CAUSAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE LIABILITY STAGE
In determining whether a Title VII violation exists, federal
courts in Title VII cases have applied a varied array of causal stan-
dards ranging from the "discernible factor" standard to a "but for"
causation standard. 9 In Bibbs, Judge Arnold's advocation of a
"discernible factor" standard and Judge Ross' approval of a "moti-
vating factor" standard typifies this inconsistency.50 The proper
standard should most effectively advance Title VII's policy objec-
tive of eradicating all forms of employment discrimination.5 1 Thus,
it is suggested that an "unlawful employment practice" may be
demonstrated whenever discrimination, in any degree, played a
factor in the employment decision.
THE REMEDIES STAGE: INCREASE THE DEFENDANT'S BURDEN
Retroactive promotion and back pay constitute the most com-
mon forms of Title VII relief available to employment discrimina-
tion victims.5 2 Although the courts agree that upon a finding of
liability, the defendant employer has the burden of proof on the
affirmative remedies issue,53 courts have disagreed regarding the
exact measure of the burden - clear and convincing evidence or
4" See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 2, at § 55.34:
It is important to separate the process of determining whether or not to award
back pay to a victorious plaintiff.., from the determination of the claim on the
merits. If the plaintiff loses on the merits the back pay issue never arises. If, how-
ever, the plaintiff wins... the defendant must have the opportunity to oppose the
award through its own affirmative defenses.
Id.
4 Compare Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1324 (discernible factor standard) with Lewis v. Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 917 (3d Cir. 1983) ("but for" causation standard), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 266 (1985). See also Brodin, supra note 26, at 293 (discussion of different
liability causal standards applied by federal courts).
11 See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1324; id. at 1330 (Ross, J., dissenting).
51 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing how lower liability causal stan-
dard promotes elimination of all employment discrimination). See also 110 CONG. REC.
13,088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey, floor manager) ("What the bill [Title VII] does
... is simply to make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment.").
52 See W. CONNOLLY & A. CONNOLLY, A PRAcTIcAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY § 1.02(3)(b)(1984); L. MODJESKA, supra note 2, at § 2.17. See also supra note 5
(background information on Title VII's affirmative remedies).
" See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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preponderance of the evidence - to be placed on the defendant."
In Bibbs, Judge Arnold's preponderance standard and Judge Mc-
Millan's clear and convincing standard exemplify this dispute.5 It
is suggested that the clear and convincing standard56 most favora-
bly achieves Title VII's objective of eradicating employment dis-
crimination without making Title VII plaintiffs more than whole.57
This higher measure of persuasion is justified since the defendant
has increased the difficulty of determining whether the employer's
discrimination was the "but for" cause of the employment decision
by injecting discriminatory factors in the employment decision. 8
Furthermore, a Title VII plaintiff's inability to recover compensa-
tory or punitive damages provides an additional reason for increas-
ing the evidentiary burden of the defendant employer.59
CONCLUSION
The separation of Title VII liability and remedial determina-
See Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Tamm, J., concurring).
Some courts have required the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his
discriminatory motive was not the "but for" cause of his decision, see, e.g., Patterson v.
Greenwood School Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1982) (higher standard seems to be
majority rule); Ostroff v. Employment Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1982) (same),
while other courts have required proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Richer-
son v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 924 (3d Cir. 1977); United Transp. Union Local, No. 974, AFL-
CIO v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976).
See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1324 n.5; id at 1329 (McMillan, J., concurring).
" "[P]roof by clear and convincing evidence calls for a greater burden of persuasion
than is ordinarily required in a civil action, for unless this were so the term would be with-
out meaning." E. FISCH, FisCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 1090 (2d ed. 1977).
" See Toney, 705 F.2d at 1373 (Tamm, J., concurring) ("higher standard of proof may
well discourage unlawful conduct by employers"); see also Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1339 (McMil-
lan, J., concurring) (same); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENc E § 340 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
1984) (clear and convincing standard often utilized when claim is "disfavored on policy
grounds").
58 Cf. NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399-400 (1983).
The employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared illegiti-
mate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and
illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and
because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.
Id. at 403.
" See Miller v. Walker Div. of Butler Mfg. Co., 577 F. Supp. 948, 950 (S.D. W. Va.
1984). Compensatory and punitive damages are not available under Title VII because such
legal damages are not statutorily authorized. See Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-
Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (equitable remedies only recov-
erable). But see Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 n.6 (D. Hawaii 1974) (remedial
objectives indicate legal damages should be allowed).
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tions is not a novel procedure for disparate treatment suits, but as
exemplified by the Bibbs court, the present state of the law evi-
dences causal and evidentiary inconsistencies. This Comment has
attempted to resolve these analytical disagreements by justifying
the severing of liability and remedial issues in all disparate treat-
ment actions, minimizing the requisite causal standard in the lia-
bility stage, and advocating a stringent evidentiary burden in the
remedial stage. It is urged that these proposals equitably balance
Title VII's policy objectives with business realities.
John P. Biedermann
